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Damage Control: Statutory Caps on Medical
Malpractice Claims, State Constitutional
Challenges, and Texas' Proposition 12
I. INTRODUCTION

In September of 2003, the State of Texas made constitutional
history: it became the first state to pass a constitutional amendment specifically empowering its state legislature to limit damage
awards in medical malpractice lawsuits.' How did medical malpractice awards become so important that a state would find it
necessary to specifically address the issue in its constitution? This
paper will explore the history behind malpractice awards and the
problems they created with insurance coverage; how states attempted to remedy the problem with statutes; and why Texas'
amendment marks a new direction in this area in which voters
will be called upon to settle the medical malpractice debate once
and for all.
From the inception of problems regarding the price and availability of medical malpractice insurance, brought about by huge
jury awards in malpractice lawsuits, most states attempted to
pass some form of statutory caps on damages in medical malpractice lawsuits in an attempt to stabilize insurance rates. However,
continued challenges by plaintiffs, on various state constitutional
grounds, have left such statutorily-imposed caps on shaky ground.
Courts have split on whether such caps are constitutional, and
this has left doctors and group health care providers in a continued state of uncertainty. Proposals to amend state constitutions
to address this issue, like the one passed in Texas, promise to finally put this issue to rest.
Well-informed voters will see the merits of placing caps on noneconomic damages,' and they will continue to vote in favor of con1. Jill Wechsler, States Tackle HealthcareIssues; Pulse on Policy; Government Actions
and Their Impact for Drug Decision-Makers, 38 FORMULARY 607 (2003). See also Kris
Axtman, Texas Vote Tests a New Tactic to Curb Jury Awards (Sept. 2003), available at

http'//www.csmonitor.com/2003/0912/p02s02-uspo.html (on file with author).
2.

Nixon & Nelson, Capping Non-Economic Damages in Medical and Other Liability

Cases, Texas House Research Organization Report on Proposition 12, at 32. "Non-economic
damages generally cover pain and suffering and similar losses, as opposed to economic
damages such as compensation for lost wages or medical bills." Id.
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stitutional amendments authorizing their state legislatures to
pass such caps. Those states that do not succeed in amending
their state constitutions will continue to suffer with the instability
and uncertainty in the area of insurance rates for medical care
providers because insurance companies fear huge jury awards for
non-economic (i.e., pain and suffering) damages. State constitutional amendments provide a viable solution to stabilizing this
area, and they promote the general health and well-being of the
public without hampering the ability of injured plaintiffs to collect
economic damages (i.e., lost wages and costs for medical bills).
II. EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM AND STATES' ATTEMPTS TO
APPLY A QUICK FIX
In the 1970's, an explosion of medical malpractice lawsuits created an insurance crisis in the health care industry. Many private
insurance carriers left the market because of the rise in claims
and the accompanying increase in costs associated with defending
against them. This situation left individual doctors and group
health care providers in many states with only a scarce supply of
insurance carriers from which to choose.3
In the early to mid-1980's, the problem turned from one of
availability into one of affordability. In general, the insurers remaining from the carrier exodus of the 1970's continued to write
policies for health care professionals, but they began charging
high premiums that many physicians could not afford to pay.'
Today, the question of whether to limit awards in medical malpractice cases continues to be a hotly debated one as many states
continue to face problems regarding availability and affordability
of professional liability insurance for health care providers.5 For
instance, in March of 2003, the American Medical Association
identified eighteen states in which medical liability has reached
"crisis proportions." These states include: Florida, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, New York, and Ohio.6 The American Medical Association identified an additional 26 states that show indications of
"a serious and worsening situation" in regards to medical liability
3. Insurance Information Institute, Hot Topics & Insurance Issues: Medical Malpractice (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.iii.orgfmedia/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal (on
file with author).
4. Michelle M. Mello et al., The New Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 2281-82 (2003).
5. Id. at 2281-84.
6. Insurance Information Institute, supra note 3.
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insurance.! In addition, physicians in West Virginia, New Jersey,
Florida, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Illinois, Texas, and Missouri
have held or threatened work stoppages to draw attention to the
high insurance premiums many doctors claim are driving them
out of practice.8
Data compiled from jury awards across the nation supports the
assertion that the costs associated with losing a medical malpractice lawsuit continue to increase. The average jury award in a
medical malpractice case was $1 million in 2001, a 43% increase
over the 1999 average of $700,000. 9 The largest jury award in
2001 was over $131 million, which represents the largest such
award in the six years leading up to 2001.10
From the inception of concerns in the healthcare profession
brought about by skyrocketing claims and jury awards in medical
malpractice lawsuits, virtually every state in the United States
enacted some sort of statutory reform to attempt to stem the flow
of claims being brought against individual physicians and hospitals.1 However, these statutes immediately faced, and those still
intact continue to face, several challenges from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs attacking statutory caps assert that such caps violate various
provisions of plaintiffs' respective state constitutions, including
equal protection, right to a jury trial, access to the courts, and due
process.' 2 The cases in this area are voluminous, and such statutorily-imposed caps have been met with varying responses in state
courts. Ultimately, even in states that have upheld such caps,
their validity and enforceability generally rest on unstable ground,
and this helps to explain the continued uncertainty-for plaintiffs,
physicians, insurance companies, and lawyers-in this area. It
also highlights the need for constitutional amendments to settle
this issue once and for all.

7. Mello, supra note 2.
8. Id.
9. Insurance Information Institute, supra note 3.
10. Id.
11. Insurance Information Institute, supra note 3. West Virginia was the only state
that did not pass any sort of tort reform regarding medical malpractice claims. Id.
12. Mark D. Hiatt, Caps on Damage Awards in Medical Malpractice Cases: Constitutional Challenges (2002), available at http://aapsonline.orgljpands/hacienda/hiattl.html (on
file with author).
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III. CASE IN POINT: GOURLEY V. NEBRASKA METHODIST HEALTH
SYSTEM

Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health System, 3 a Nebraska
case, provides a perfect example of the typical state constitutional
challenges plaintiffs mount against the enforcement of a statute
intended to cap jury awards in malpractice lawsuits. This case
also shows how one state supreme court has grappled with the
issues presented by such challenges.
In this case, the Gourleys, parents of a child born with brain
damage, brought a medical malpractice action against their obstetrician-gynecologist, Dr. Knolla, her employer, OB/GYN Group,
and Nebraska
Methodist Hospital for allegedly negligent pre-natal
4
care.

During her pregnancy, Mrs. Gourley was under the care of Dr.
Knolla, an obstetrician-gynecologist employed by the OB/GYN
Group. During the thirty-sixth week of her pregnancy, Mrs. Gourley informed Dr. Knolla that she noticed less movement from the
twin fetuses she was carrying, but Knolla assured her that everything appeared to be fine." After two more days had passed, Mrs.
Gourley called the OB/GYN Group and expressed continued concerns. She returned to OB/GYN group the same day and was instructed by another OB/GYN Group physician, Dr. Dietrich, to
proceed for additional examination at Nebraska Methodist Hospi6
tal.'
During this examination, it was determined that the twins
would have to be delivered via an emergency cesarean section.
The operation was performed and two twin boys, Colin and Connor, were born. 7 Colin was born with brain damage and currently suffers from cerebral palsy and several related physical,
cognitive, and behavioral health problems. 8
The Gourleys' malpractice suit claimed that Knolla, OB/GYN
Group, and Nebraska Methodist Hospital were jointly and severally liable for failing to properly monitor the pre-natal status of
the twins. A jury determined that Knolla was 60% negligent and

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

663 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003).
Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id.
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that the OB/GYN group was 40% negligent, and the total damages
award came to $5,625,000.'9
The trial court reduced the jury award in accordance with Nebraska's statute limiting jury awards in medical malpractice
cases, and entered judgment for the Gourleys, jointly and severally against Knolla and OB/GYN Group, for $1,250,000.21 The
Gourleys promptly filed a second motion for a new trial contending
that the caps on damages imposed by section 44-2825(1) violated
the Nebraska Constitution.2
After overruling a motion filed by Knolla and OB/GYN Group,
the trial court reversed its original decision and held that the cap
on damages in section 44-2825(1) violated the guaranty of equal
protection under NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3,3 and it also violated a
plaintiffs right to a jury trial under NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6.4
Thus, the trial court vacated its previous order and entered judgment for the Gourleys in the full jury verdict amount of
$5,625,000.25 Knolla and OB/GYN Group appealed to the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, and the Gourleys filed a cross-appeal regarding the dismissal of Nebraska Methodist Hospital. 6
With respect to the state constitutional issues of the trial court's
ruling, Knolla and OB/GYN Group argued that the cap in section
44-2825(1) was constitutional and should have been applied to

19. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 56. Nebraska Methodist Hospital was dismissed from the
case after moving for a directed verdict at the close of the Gourleys' case-in-chief. The
Gourleys moved for a new trial based on the dismissal of the hospital, but the trial court
denied the motion. Id.
20. Id. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825(1) (1998) of the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability
Act caps recoverable damages in medical malpractice actions at $1,250,000. Id. at 55.
21. Id. at 56.
22. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 56. The Gourleys asserted that the statutory cap "violated
their rights to (1) equal protection; (2) a jury trial; (3) an open court and full remedy; (4)
substantive due process; and (5) life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The Gourleys
further argued that the cap was "unconstitutional special legislation." Id.
23. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, nor be denied equal protection of the laws." NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 3 (2003).
24. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides that "It]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the Legislature may authorize trial by a jury of a less number than twelve in
courts inferior to the District [trial] Court, and may by general law authorize a verdict in
civil cases in any court by not less than five-sixths of the jury." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6
(2003).
25. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 56.
26. Id. at 56-57.
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limit the jury's $5.6 million award.2 7 The Gourleys argued in support of the trial court's finding that section 44-2825(1) was unconstitutional by asserting that the statute violated: (1) special legislation, (2) equal protection, (3) open courts and right to a remedy,
(4) right to a jury trial, (5) taking of property, and (6) separation of
powers." The Supreme Court of Nebraska noted that "[t]he Gourleys rely solely on provisions of the state [of Nebraska's] Constitution."29 The Nebraska high court proceeded to address the Gourleys' constitutional contentions in turn.
a.

Special Legislation

The Gourleys argued that section 44-2825(1) was unconstitutional special legislation because "it provide[d] a special privilege
to health care professionals while placing a burden on the most
severely injured plaintiffs."0
The court analyzed the special legislation clause of the Nebraska Constitution and concluded that its purpose was "the prevention of legislation which arbitrarily benefits or grants 'special
favors' to a specific class."31 The court went on to state that a legislative act will be deemed an unconstitutional act of special legislation, under the Nebraska Constitution, if it created an arbitrary
method of classification or if it creates a permanently closed
class. 2 The Supreme Court of Nebraska went on to note that a
classification will be deemed constitutional when it is based upon
public policy and the classification itself bears some reasonable
relation to the subject legislation's goal of achieving that public
policy interest.3
Ultimately, the court concluded that section 44-2825(1) was
based upon legitimate public policy grounds and that the classifi27. Id. at 64. The Supreme Court of Nebraska addressed the state constitutional issues
surrounding section 44-2825(1) after disposing of several procedural arguments raised by
defendants Knolla and OB/GYN group. Id.
28. Id.
29. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 64.
30. Id. at 65. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18 provides in pertinent part:
The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following cases, that
is to say ... [G]ranting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or
exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise whatever... [I]n all other cases where a
general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18 (2003).
31. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 65.
32. Id. (quoting Bergan Mercy Hosp. Sys. v. Haven, 620 N.W.2d 339 (Neb. 2000)). The
court found that the instant case did not involve a permanently closed class. Id.
33. Id. at 65-66 (citations omitted).
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cation was reasonably related to those grounds, and therefore, the
cap did not constitute prohibited special legislation.' The court
examined the legislative history behind the passage of the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act and found the Nebraska
State Legislature's specific findings and intent to provide adequate public policy justifications:
The intent of [the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act] is
to serve the public interest by providing an alternative
method for determining malpractice claims in order to improve availability of medical care, to improve its quality and
to reduce the cost thereof, and to [eInsure the availability of
malpractice insurancecoverage at reasonably rates.35
b.

Equal Protection

The Gourleys next contended that the cap violated the equal
protection clause of the Nebraska Constitution, and that the court
should apply some sort of heightened level of review in striking it
down.36
The Supreme Court of Nebraska found that "[since] the interests at issue are economic, we apply the rational basis test."37 The
court held that section 44-2825(1) satisfied the rational basis test
because "[r]educing health care costs and encouraging the provision of medical services are legitimate goals which can reasonably
be thought to be furthered by lowering the amount of medical
malpractice judgments."" Finding the rational basis test met, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded that the cap on damages
satisfied equal protection.

34. Id. at 69-70.
35. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 69 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2801 (1998)) (emphasis
added).
36. Id. at 70-71. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3, supra note 22.
37. Id. at 71.
Under the rational basis test, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied as long as
there is (1) a plausible policy reason for the classification, (2) the legislative facts on
which the classification is apparently based may rationally have been considered to
be true by the decision-maker, and (3) the relationship of the classification to its goal
is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.
Id. (quoting Pfizer v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 616 N.W.2d 326 (Neb. 2000)).
38. Id. at 72 (referencing Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002)).
39. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll courts shall be open,
and every person, for any injury done him or her in his or her lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law and justice administered without denial or
delay." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13 (2003).
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Open Courts and Right to Remedy

The next argument advanced in support of finding section 442825(1) unconstitutional was that it violated the open courts provision of the Nebraska Constitution and denied injured parties
their right to a remedy.3 9 The Gourleys argued that their action
existed at common law, and as such, it was shielded from statutory modification because "common law rights and remedies that
were in place at the time the [Nebraska] constitution was adopted
are protected from legislative change." '
The court quickly disposed of this argument by first noting that
the common law of England was adopted by statute in the state of
Nebraska, and therefore, it existed by legislative enactment and
may be repealed or altered.41 Also, the court concluded that even if
the Gourleys' common law argument was completely valid, section
44-2825(1) would still pass constitutional muster because it "does
not bar access to the court or deny a remedy, [but] [i]nstead it redefines the substantive law by limiting the amount of damages a
plaintiff can recover."
d.

Right to a Jury Trial

The Gourleys' next assertion in support of the trial judge's holding was that the statutory cap violated their right to a trial by
jury.43 Defendants Knolla and OB/GYN Group counter-argued
that if the Legislature is authorized to abolish a common-law
cause of action, then it must also have the power to limit the
amount of damages recoverable in such an action. 4
Besides agreeing with the defendants' argument in finding that
plaintiffs' right to a jury trial was not violated by application of
section 44-2825(1), the Nebraska high court also stressed that
"[t]he remedy is a question of law, not fact, and it is not a matter
to be decided by the jury."'

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 73.
Id. at 74 (referencing NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-101 (Reissue 1998)).
Id. (citation omitted).
See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6, supra note 24.
Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 74-75.
Id. at 75 (citations omitted).
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Separationof Powers

The last constitutional challenge the Gourleys asserted before
the Nebraska high court was that section 44-2825(1) violated the
separation of powers provision of the state's constitution.4 6 The
theory behind their argument was that the cap acted as a legislative judgment on damages, effectively interfering with a power
reserved for the judiciary.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded that the cap did not
act as a legislative judgment on damages or otherwise violate
principles of separation of powers. 4 ' First, the court stated that
the cap in no way required the legislature to review specific disputes or determine the amount of damages. The court wrote: "Instead-without regard to the facts of a particular case-the cap
imposes a limit on recovery in all medical malpractice cases as a
matter of legislative policy."' 8 Concluding that this was a proper
legislative function, the court dismissed the Gourleys' final state
constitutional
argument against the constitutionality of section
49

44-2585( 1).
f

Final Disposition in Gourley: More Than Meets the Eye

The Supreme Court of Nebraska found the statutory cap prescribed by section 44-2825(1) to be constitutional, and therefore,
the trial court's order finding that it was unconstitutional was reversed, and the trial court was ordered to reinstate the award to
the Gourleys at the capped amount of $1,250,000.5o However, this
5-2 per curiam opinion," with numerous concurrences and dissents, indicates a court that is "sharply divided" on this issue,

46. NEB. CONST. art. II, § 1 provides that "[tihe powers of the government of this state
are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative executive and judicial, and no
person or collection of persons being one of these departments, shall exercise any power
properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted." NEB. CONST. art. II, § 1 (2003).
47. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 77.
48. Id.
49. Id. The remainder of the majority opinion dismissed the Gourleys' cross-appeal in
regards to the trial court's dismissal of Nebraska Methodist Hosp. as a co-defendant. Id. at
77-78.
50. Id. at 78.
51. A per curiam opinion is defined as "[a]n opinion handed down by an appellate court
without identifying the individual judge who wrote the opinion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
896 (7th ed. 1999).
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which2 "suggests that the cap remains vulnerable despite the rul"
ing. 5
It is particularly noteworthy that the Gourleys did not raise the
issue of due process in their arguments and briefs before the Supreme Court of Nebraska despite the fact that they raised it in the
lower court." There was no indication or explanation of why the
due process claim was not raised on appeal. In his concurrence,
Justice Gerrard makes this point and indicates that if due process
had been raised on appeal, then he would have voted to strike
down the cap:
In my view, this question when placed in its proper constitutional framework, implicates the constitutional right to substantive due process of law. There is a substantial overlap between the tests applied under due process and equal protection analysis. The distinction is that equal protection and
special legislation analyses are focused on the classes created
by a statute and whether there is justification for making
such classifications and treating those classes differently.
Due process, on the other hand, questions the justification for
abrogating a particular legal right, and the appropriate scrutiny is determined by the importance of the right that is at issue. Thus, while the act does not create suspect classifications, and there may be some rational basis for treating
health care tort-feasors differently from other tort-feasors,
whether economic damages may be taken from negligently injured persons is a separate issue and calls for a different constitutional analysis. Because my concerns regard the nature
of the basic right that has been taken-the right to recover
proven economic damages-those concerns are properly addressed by a due process analysis.'

52. Andrews Publications, Nebraska Supreme Court Upholds State's Cap on Med-Mal
Awards, 4 ANNHLI 12, at 7 (June 2003).
53. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 85 (Gerrard, J., concurring). "The parties in this case have
not presented the question whether the act, as applied, violates substantive due process,
and I agree with the per curiam opinion's determination that we should not overthrow a
legislative enactment on the basis of authority not raised and argued by the parties." Id.
(Gerrard, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 83 (Gerrard, J., concurring). Justice Gerrard noted in his concurrence that
although the majority of states with caps still intact limit only non-economic damages, the
Nebraska cap covers both economic and non-economic damages. Id. at 81 (Gerrard, J.,
concurring).
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Nebraska Chief Justice Hendry indicated in his concurring/dissenting opinion that he agreed with Justice Gerrard's due
process analysis.55
Justice McCormack wrote a blistering concurrence/dissent in
which he concluded that Nebraska's statutory cap violated both
the constitutional provisions of due process and special legislation.56 Regarding special legislation, Justice McCormack opined
that:
The cap grants a privilege to all health care providers whose
negligence causes catastrophic damages, i.e. damages in excess of $1,250,000, because they are liable for less than 100
percent of the damages they cause. The general class standing in the same relation to these health care providers is all
other professional [health] services providers who commit
malpractice and cause catastrophic damages and who are liable for 100 percent of the damages they cause... Met the
Legislature has chosen to provide a benefit to one subset of
the general class by exempting those health care providers
whose negligence causes damages in excess of $1,250,000
from full liability for their negligent actions. Thus, I conclude
that the cap is unconstitutional special legislation in violation
of Neb. Const. art. III, § 18."
On the issue of due process, Justice McCormack agreed with
Justice Gerrard and stated he would also have found the cap unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due process had the
parties raised and argued that provision of the Nebraska Constitution.5 8 Justice Carlson also filed a concurrence/dissent in which
he stated that he would have struck the cap down on both special
legislation and substantive due process grounds.5 9

55. Id. at 86-87 (Hendry, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Beyond agreeing
that the cap was open to attack on due process grounds, C.J. Hendry also indicates that he
might find section 44-2825(1) to be an unconstitutional act of special legislation if a "proper
party" with a "proper record" brought such a challenge. Id. (Hendry, C.J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
56. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 87-96 (McCormack, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Justice McCormack concurred with the per curiam opinion regarding defendants'
procedural challenges and the Gourley's cross-appeal challenging the dismissal of Nebraska
Methodist Hosp. as a co-defendant. Id. at 87 (McCormack, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 91-92 (McCormack, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
58. Id. at 92 (McCormack, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
59. Id. at 97 (Carlson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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The concurrences and dissents in Gourley indicate just how contentious the decision was. If the Gourleys had raised substantive
due process in the appeal, then the Supreme Court of Nebraska
would have most likely voted 4-3 to strike down the cap instead of
the 5-2 opinion upholding it. Furthermore, two justices, Stephan
and Miller-Lerman, did not participate in the decision," and it is
quite possible that their votes could have affected the outcome of
the case.
Gourley is just a recent example from a single state that shows
the uncertainty and instability that many statutorily-based caps
rest upon. Not only was there a difference of opinion between the
trial court and the high court, but even more importantly, there
was a difference of opinion among the Supreme Court of Nebraska
justices. Beyond showing the intrastate disagreement regarding
statutory medical malpractice caps, Gourley also highlights the
splits among and within the states.
IV. BEYOND GOURLEY: CONFLICTING STATE VIEWS

Throughout the Gourley opinion, there are several mentions of
the disagreements among states when it comes to accepting or
rejecting medical malpractice caps as constitutional. In regards to
challenges based on special legislation provisions, the Gourley majority noted that "other states have also expressed agreement that
a cap on damages for medical malpractice does not constitute special legislation." 1 Besides the Nebraska Supreme Court, other
state high courts have found that caps do not constitute special
legislation under their own constitutions, including Virginia62 and
Idaho.' However, a majority of the Supreme Court of Illinois has
held that such caps amount to unconstitutional special legislation.'
In regards to challenges based on equal protection, "[a] majority
of jurisdictions apply a rational basis or other similar test and determine that a statutory cap on damages does not violate equal
protection."6 5 These states include West Virginia,6 6 Louisiana, 67
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 78.
Id. at 69-70 (citations omitted).
See generally Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
See generally Kirkland v. Blaine County Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000).
See generally Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 71.
See generally Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991).
See generally Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992).
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and Colorado.68 Also, in 2002, the Michigan Court of Appeals
found that statutory caps do not violate equal protection, 9 but the
Supreme Court of Michigan has granted an appeal of this decision
that is currently pending."
In contrast to the above decisions, a minority of state courts
have applied a heightened standard of scrutiny under their own
equal protection provisions and determined statutory caps to be
unconstitutional.7 ' These states include New Hampshire 2 and
North Dakota."
The majority of courts addressing plaintiffs' challenges based on
the open courts and right to remedy provisions of their respective
state constitutions have held that caps on damages are constitutional 4 These states include West Virginia,7 5 Maryland, 6 Indiana, 77 and New Mexico." The minority of courts who take the opposing view include South Dakota7 ' and Texas. °
In regards to whether caps on damages violate a plaintiffs right
to a jury trial under state constitutional provisions, courts are
split, but the majority hold that a cap does not violate the right to
trial by jury.8' Some of the states that do not find a constitutional
violation are Colorado,8 2 Idaho,83 and Alaska.' State high courts
that have determined that a damages limit does violate a plaintiffs right to a jury trial include Washington85 and Alabama.88
Regarding separation of powers provisions of state constitutions, some courts "have determined that a cap on damages does
68. See generally Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993) (en
banc).
69. See Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 437 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
70. See Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 223 (Mich. 2003). "Application for leave to
appeal from the June 7, 2002 decision of the Court of Aplpeals [sic] is GRANTED limited to
the issues [of] whether 257.401(3) constitutes an unconstitutional denial of plaintiffs right
to a jury trial, equal protection, or due process." Id.
71. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 71.
72. See generally Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
73. See generally Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
74. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 73.
75. See generally Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 877.
76. See generally Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992).
77. See generally Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980).
78. See generally Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 305 (N.M. 1998).
79. See generally Certification of Questions of Law, 544 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996).
80. See generally Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
81. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 75.
82. See generally Scholz, 851 P.2d at 901.
83. See generally Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1115.
84. See generally Evans, 56 P.3d at 1046.
85. See generally Sofie v. Fireboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
86. See generally Moore v. Mobile Infantry Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991).
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not violate [such] principles."8 7 Among these states are Virginia,"
West Virginia, 9 and Alaska.9" However, the Supreme Court of
Illinois concluded "that the determination whether a verdict was
excessive was a discretionary function of the trial court and that a
cap on damages improperly delegated that function to the Legislature."9"
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court of Nebraska did
not have the opportunity to decide whether the Nebraska statutory cap violated substantive due process notions, but the concurrences and dissents in Gourley indicate that a majority of the
court who heard the case would have found the caps unconstitutional on due process grounds if the parties had raised and argued
that constitutional provision.9 2 Several other state courts that
have had the opportunity to address the issue have "concluded
that the right to recover damages for personal injury is essential,
and caps on damages are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny in
making constitutional determinations."9 3 These states include
Utah9" and South Dakota.95
Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that there are clear disagreements among the states regarding the constitutionality of
statutory caps on medical malpractice awards. These splits, based
on several constitutional principles, further drive home the point
that purely statutorily-based caps remain open to attack. This
leaves injured patients, health care professionals, plaintiffs bar,
and the defense bar on shaky ground. In a state where caps have
been upheld, all it would take is a novel constitutional argument
or a change in the membership of a state's supreme court to alter
the outcome of any given decision in this area.9 6

87. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 76.
88. See generally Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 525.
89. See generally Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2001).
90. See generally Evans, 56 P.3d at 1046.
91. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 76 (referencing Best, 689 N.E. 2d at 1057).
92. Id. at 80-97 (Gerrard, J., concurring, Hendry, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part, McCormack, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and Carlson, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
93. Id. at 84 (Gerrard, J., concurring).
94. See generally Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P. 2d 348 (Utah 1989).
95. See generally Matterof Certification,544 N.W. 2d at 183.
96. It is worth noting that California and a handful of other states have been the exception to the rule: California has had stability in this area through early-established precedent upholding the validity of their statutory caps on malpractice awards. California has
capped non-economic damages by statute since 1975. See Insurance Information Institute,
supra note 3.

Spring 2004

Medical Malpractice Caps

551

V. ENTER PROPOSITION 12

Amid the mass amount of conflict and confusion the great number of states have faced regarding statutory attempts to cap medical malpractice awards, it was only a matter of time until necessity would mark a new direction in this area. Enter Texas. Enter
Proposition 12.
In 1977, the Texas State Legislature passed the Medical Liability and Insurance Act. The purpose of this act was to limit noneconomic damages in medical liability cases.9 7 The cap was indexed at the Consumer Price Index and has increased from
$500,000 in 1975 to approximately $1.3 million in 2003.98
The cap was intended to apply to damages in all medical malpractice cases, but the Texas Supreme Court ruled the cap unconstitutional except in wrongful death cases. 99 In Lucas v. U.S.,"'
decided in 1988, the Supreme Court of Texas held that a statutory
limitation on medical malpractice for the purpose of reducing malpractice premiums was unconstitutional as violating TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 13, the Open Courts doctrine, 0' which guarantees meaningful access to the courts. 2 This ruling took away most of the
intended effectiveness of the statute, and it placed a constitutional
roadblock in the way of any similar statutory provisions attempting to limit malpractice awards.
In June of 2003, Texas lawmakers enacted H.B. 4,103 which caps
non-economic damages in medical malpractice suits at $250,000
for all physicians or health care providers, and $250,000 for each
health care institution, not to exceed $500,000 for all such institutions. This
$750,000 cap applies regardless of the number of de04
fendants.
Knowing this statute would be subject to the same state constitutional challenges that limited the 1977 statutory cap, Texas
97. Nixon & Nelson, supra note 2, at 32.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 687.
101. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides in pertinent part that "[all courts shall be open,
and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (2003).
102. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 692; see also Nixon & Nelson, supra note 2, at 32.
103. H.B. 4 passed by large majorities in both the Texas House, 27 to 4 (87%), and in the
Senate, 110 to 34 (76%). Richard J. Trabulshi, Jr., Proposed ConstitutionalAmendment 12,

66 TEX. B.J. 653 (2003).
104. Stephanie Levy, Damages Setback in Texas; Caps Out in Missouri, 29 ADVOCATE 9,
at 1 (2003).
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Governor Rick Perry, a Republican, began campaigning for a constitutional amendment that would specifically grant the Texas
Legislature the power to limit damages in medical malpractice
cases. 1°5 State Representative Joe Nixon (R-Houston), sponsored
the legislation to put the amendment [that became Proposition 12]
on the September 2003 statewide election ballot. 1 6
Proposition 12 was hotly contested, and it pitted doctors against
lawyers and Republican factions against Texas Democrats. More
than $13 million was spent advertising for and against Proposition 12, and both sides organized massive campaigns in support of
their respective positions. 107
On September 13th, Texas voters went to the ballot boxes, and
Proposition 12 passed by a slim margin. The final tally put out by
the Texas Secretary of State showed 51% (750,077 votes) for the
amendment and 49% (717,342 votes) against it. 0 8 Charles W. Bailey, Jr., president of the Texas Medical Association, praised the
outcome, stating: "[T]he real winners of this election are the people of Texas who can be more certain that a doctor will be there for
them when they're sick or injured." 9 On the other side of the battle, Deborah Hankinson, a former Texas Supreme Court justice
who led the opposition to Proposition 12, focused on the narrow
passage of the amendment. "Our message was the constitution
and the people's rights under the constitution ... [t]hat's clearly
important to Texans as well," she stated."0
Upon passage, Proposition 12 became Art. III, § 66 of the Constitution of the State of Texas."' The pertinent portions of this
constitutional amendment state:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this constitution, the
legislature by statute may determine the limit of liability for
all damages and losses, however characterized, other than
economic damages, of a provider of medical or health care
with respect to treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed
105. Janet Elliott, Texans Pass Prop. 12 in Statewide Election, Hous. CHRON. (Sept. 19,
2003), available at http://www.chron.com/com/cs/CDA/story.hts/topstory/2097196 (on file
with author).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Erica Pitzi, Proposition 12 Passes by Narrow Margin (Sept. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.msnbc.com/local/kamr/M325323.asp?cpl=l (on file with author).
109. See Elliott, supra note 104.
110. Id.
111. Products Liability Advisory, Texas Amends its Constitution to Permit Statutory
Caps on Non-economic Damages, 176 P.L. ADVISORY 5 (2003).
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departure from an accepted standard of medical of health care
or safety, however characterized, that is or other claimed to be
a cause of, or that contributes or is claimed to contribute to,
disease, injury, or death of a person. This subsection applies
without regard to whether the claim or cause of action arises
under or is derived from common law, a statute, or other law,
including any claim or cause of action based or sounding in
tort, contract, or any other theory or ay combination of theories of liability. The claim or cause of action includes a medical or
health care liability claim as defined by the legisla112
ture.
This amendment grants the Texas Legislature the specific authority to pass caps in malpractice cases and it appears to shore up
any future challenges to the caps prescribed by H.B. 4.
This amendment is important, however, even beyond the state
of Texas. It marks a historic new direction in this area. Unlike
the previous three decades, that have produced continued battles
and uncertainty over whether state legislatures could impose
statutory caps without violating their respective state constitutions, Texas' Proposition 12 marked the first time that a state was
able to successfully put the answer in the hands of the voters." 3
By voting in favor of Proposition 12, Texans gave their state legislature the specific authority to pass such caps without the traditional fears of the caps being attacked by plaintiffs with an array
of state constitutional challenges. Where statutory caps were
open to attacks and constant uncertainty, it would seem that the
specific constitutional authorization provided by Texas' art. III, §
66 will establish, like it or not, a stable foundation in this historically volatile area. It also appears that other states will soon follow suit.
VI. OTHER STATES CONTEMPLATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

It might be too soon to gauge the overall effects of Proposition
12's passage on other states, but there are certainly other state
policymakers already looking to let the voters settle the medical
malpractice cap debate once and for all.
112. TEX. CONST. art 3, § 66 (2003).
113. See generally Axtman, supra note 1. See also Leona Siadek, Medical Malpractice
Liability Still on Center Stage, THE DOCTOR'S ADVOC. (2003), available at
http://www.thedoctors.com/publications/docadv/2003 (on file with author).
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For instance, in Florida, Republicans and doctors have stepped
up their efforts to place an amendment similar to the one in Texas
on Florida's next statewide ballot. In August of 2003, Republican
leaders, including Florida Representative and House Speaker
Johnnie Byrd (R-Plant City) and Florida Representative Connie
Mack (R-Fort Lauderdale), addressed a town meeting of Duval
County doctors.1 14 The town meeting focused on a drive to collect
enough signatures to put a constitutional amendment on the Florida ballot in 2004 that would limit jury awards in malpractice
suits."5
On April 1, 2003, Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, a Democrat, set up a task force to make recommendations on reforming the
medical malpractice liability system in Pennsylvania. Rendell
stated: "[I]n parts of Pennsylvania, medical malpractice rates are
among the highest in the nation and the state has been grappling
with the problem for several years.""6 The panel was unable to
reach a consensus regarding caps on pain and suffering damages,
and "the state currently has no limit on non-economic damages. " 17
However, just days after the passage of the Texas amendment,
advocates for physicians and malpractice insurers appeared at a
state Senate Judiciary Committee hearing to urge Pennsylvania
lawmakers to approve a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages in
malpractice lawsuits."'
The hearing marked the first step in a process to place a
measure on the November 2004 ballot that would allow voters
to vote on a cap on non-economic damages. The State Legislature must approve the measure in two consecutive sessions
before the measure can appear on the ballot. If approved by
voters, the state Legislature in 2005 would vote on the is119
sue.
Although the hearing appeared to be scheduled before the passage
of the Texas amendment, the success of Proposition 12 in Texas
114. John Snow, Medical Malpractice Takes on Constitutional Look, TAMPA BAY B.J.
(Aug. 5, 2003), available at httpJ/www.bizjournals.com.tampabay/stories/2003/08/04/daily
18.html (on file with author).
115. Id.
116. Insurance Information Institute, supra note 3.
117. Id.
118. American Health Line, Headline: Malpractice:AHL Features Developments in Six
States, AM. HEALTH LINE (Sept. 26, 2003), as reported by the Pittsburgh-Post Gazette on
Sept. 16, 2003 (on file with author).
119. Id.
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surely provided cap supporters in Pennsylvania with additional
ammunition.
In July of 2003, then Kentucky gubernatorial candidate and
Representative Ernie Fletcher (R-Ky.), a doctor, called for an
amendment to the Kentucky Constitution to allow caps on jury
awards in medical malpractice lawsuits.1 20 On November 4, 2003,
Fletcher
was elected governor of Kentucky by a 55% to 45% mar121
gin.

Lastly, in October of 2003, Wyoming Governor Dave Freudenthal, a Democrat, proposed a constitutional amendment that
would specifically authorize state lawmakers to pass legislation
that would cap non-economic damages in malpractice lawsuits."
Wyoming's state constitution currently prevents passage of such
caps. The Legislature must consider Freudenthal's proposed
amendment, and if it 2is3 approved, it will appear on the November
2004 statewide ballot.'
VII. ANALYSIS
With the explosion of medical malpractice lawsuits that began
in the 1970's, a crisis developed in the healthcare industry as affordable and available professional liability insurance became
scarce in many states. Virtually every state proposed some form
of statutory cap as a "quick fix" to the problem. However, Gourley,
and a plethora of other cases like it, exemplify the split of opinion
in state courts when these statutes are attacked on varying state
constitutional grounds. It also evidences how unstable this area
is. This has kept medical malpractice insurance in many states at
a crisis point despite the existence of such statutes.
Passage of Texas' Proposition 12 points to a new direction and
possibly a permanent solution to this problem: putting it to the
voters to decide whether their state legislatures should be empowered to limit caps on malpractice awards. The slim passage of the
120. American Health Line, Headline: Malpractice: AHL Highlights Developments in
Nine States, AM. HEALTH LINE (July 3, 2003), as reported by the Lexington Herald Leader
on July 2, 2003 (on file with author).
121. Charles Wolfe, Rep. Ernie FletcherElected Governor of Kentucky, CHI. SUN TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2003), available at http'//www.suntimes.com/output/electt07ky.html (on file with
author).
122. American Health Line, Headline:Malpractice:AHL FeaturesDevelopments in Four
States, AM. HEALTH LINE (Nov. 7, 2003), as reported by the Associated Press and the Billings Gazette on Oct. 24, 2003 (on file with author).
123. Id.
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Texas amendment shows just what a contentious issue malpractice caps are, and it raises questions as to whether this will truly
"fix" the problem. Recent activities in states like Florida and
Pennsylvania indicate that medical malpractice caps will ultimately be decided in the ballot boxes in many states. This is a
positive move that provides hope that the problems that have
loomed in this area will be settled once and for all.
Any notion that the federal government might weigh in on this
issue was dashed on July 10, 2003, when the United States Senate
killed legislation to limit non-economic damage recoveries in
medical malpractice suits to $250,000. The legislation would have
also capped punitive damages at the greater of $250,000 or twice
the amount of economic damages. 2 4 The HEALTH Act, as it was
dubbed, passed the House earlier in 2003, but it lost on the Senate
floor in a 49-48 vote, with Republicans favoring it and Democrats
opposing it. 125 Even if the federal legislation had passed, it would
appear that it would have been subject to all of the constitutional
attacks that make state statutory caps vulnerable. This drives
home the notion that malpractice caps will continue to be settled
on a state-by-state basis.
Supporters of caps on damages in medical malpractice awards
generally advocate caps on non-economic damages. Arguments in
support of such caps are that they will help to stabilize the availability and affordability of insurance rates for medical care providers in that more insurers will be willing to do business in states
where there is no threat of juries returning a huge award for a
plaintiff's pain and suffering. The increased availability and affordability of professional liability insurance will ultimately improve the price and quality of care that physicians and group
health care providers will be able to provide.
Opponents of caps, on the other hand, argue that state legislatures should not be given authority to restrict constitutionally protected access to relief in court when injured plaintiffs are seeking
damages for their losses and pain. Further, opponents argue that
contribute to a reducthere is no concrete proof that caps actually
27
insurance.
malpractice
on
tion in rates

124. Medical Malpractice Law & Strategy, U.S. Senate Says No to Tort Reform Bill, 20
MED. MAL. NEWS 9, at 6 (July 16, 2003).
125. Id.
126. See generally Nixon & Nelson, supra note 2, at 32-34.
127. See id.
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Although both sides make valid points, it would appear that imposing limits on caps is a wise move for states to make. Although,
as opponents point out, there is no overwhelming evidence that
caps really help lower rates for medical malpractice insurance,
there are some strong indications that they are helping in states
that have solidly supported such caps. For instance, after Texas
passed Proposition 12, the largest professional medical liability
insurer in the state announced it would immediately roll back
premiums by 12%, effective January 2004.128 Further, California,
a state whose high court has long held statutory caps constitutional, has consistently enjoyed lower insurance rates than the
rest of the nation. 129 Thus, caps on damages in medical malpractice cases can help lower malpractice rates, but this can only happen in states where the constitutionality of such caps rests on a
solid foundation. Since courts in the majority of states have been
uncertain in this area, state constitutional amendments promise
to give the needed finality and stability in this area. This stability
can help lower insurance rates for medical providers and avert the
"crisis" situation many states currently face.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The future of medical malpractice caps appears to rest in the
hands of individual state voters. As more states follow Texas' lead
and push for constitutional amendments in this domain, voters
will be called upon to decide whether or not their respective state
legislatures should have the power to limit jury awards in medical
malpractice lawsuits. Well-informed voters will vote in favor of
caps as a means to provide a level of stability and finality in this
area. Once insurance carriers feel confident that awards for noneconomic damages are truly limited, and that there is little danger
of a huge jury verdict for pain and suffering being entered against
them, these carriers will then begin to expand availability and
affordability to physicians and group health care providers across
the country. This will help end the "medical malpractice crisis"
once and for all. States that do not follow the path of Texas only
face continued instability and problems with doctors in their
states finding affordable coverage. Legislators across the country
should advocate specific amendments limiting non-economic dam128. Michael Romano, Cooler in Texas?; Insurer Ready to lower malpractice premiums,
33 MODERN HEALTHCARE CHICAGO 18 (Sept. 22, 2003).
129. Nixon & Nelson, supra note 2, at 33.
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ages in medical malpractice lawsuits, and they should encourage
their constituents to support and adopt these measures into their
respective state constitutions.
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